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ABSTRACT. Not all possible distributions of a given total of emission
permits are compatible with the attainment of first-best Pareto efficiency. In
fact, of the infinitely many ways of distributing a given total of permits between
a fixed number of parties, only a finite number can lead to efficiency. We can
therefore evaluate permit allocations not only in terms of their equity, but also
in terms of their efficiency. If there are no other redistributive instruments in
the policy environment, the traditional orthogonality of equity and efficiency
does not hold here. This has important implications for arguments about the
initial international distribution of entitlements to produce carbon dioxide.
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1. EQUITY, EFFICIENCY AND CO2 ABATEMENT
The atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide has become a matter of widespread
concern in the last decade. It is generally recognized that it has the capacity to change
the global climate in ways which are potentially very harmful but are presently not
forecastable (for a review see Chichilnisky and Heal [3]). Consequently countries at
the 1992 "Earth Summit" in Rio de Janeiro agreed to cut back CO2 emissions to their
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1990 levels by the end of the century. This policy could easily cost several percent
of GNP (Weyant [21]). In conformity with the conclusions of the "Earth Summit",
the US administration has recently made a very tentative move in the direction of
policies to reduce CO2 emissions. In this it is lagging some way behind other industrial
countries, most of which have already made more definitive moves.
The adoption of an ambitious target for CO2 emission has naturally brought in
its wake a focus on the policy the instruments available for achieving this goal. This
comes at the same time as an increasing awareness of the economic burden of en-
vironmental protection, and the two together have produced a particular interest
in market-based policy instruments. There are two frameworks from which such
instruments emerge: the Pigouvian framework of corrective taxes and subsidies, as
developed by Meade [15], and the Coasian tradition of property rights [7], which has
evolved to tradeable permits. The OECD has recently studied in detail the possibility
of a global carbon tax (see Coppel [8] and Chichilnisky [2]), and the principles behind
this have already been subject to detailed examination (see Hartwick [13] for an inter-
esting perspective). Tradeable permits are already in use in the USA for regulating a
variety of emissions: SO2, lead and various water-borne wastes. The introduction of a
global permit market for CO2 is now firmly on the international agenda (Chichilnisky
and Heal [6] and Grubb [12]). Tradeable permits have many economic attractions as
instruments for controlling atmospheric emissions (see for example Dales [9] or any
standard environmental text), and there is now a growing body of literature on their
practical application (Noll [17], Stavins [19], Stavins and Hahn [20]).
This paper is about the implementation of a global market for CO2 emission
permits. We point out that such a market has an important characteristic which had
not previously been noted, a characteristic which has quite significant economic and
political implications. The point which we highlight is an unexpected link between
equity and efficiency: the initial distribution of property rights or emission permits
determines whether or not a global CO2 permit market will operate efficiently. Prior
to now, it has been generally assumed that the manner in which emission permits are
initially distributed will not affect the efficiency of the market—though it will of course
affect the distribution of income resulting from the operation of the market. This is
the original Coase position [7]: that whatever the initial distribution of permits, the
market can bring about a Pareto efficient allocation of resources. In fact a stronger
claim is sometimes made: that the equilibrium allocation of resources is not affected
by the initial distribution of permits. Clearly the conditions for this stronger claim
to be true are very restrictive indeed—a total absence of income effects (see Milgrom
and Roberts, chapter 2 [16]).
We show below that the manner in which emission rights are initially distributed
determines the possibility of the market attaining a Pareto efficient outcome. There
are many ways (uncountably many, in fact) of distributing a given total of emission
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rights between participants: in general, only a finite number of these distributions
will be compatible with the efficient operation of the market. In this case equity and
efficiency are not orthogonal, as in the first and second theorems of welfare economics.
How does this happen?
The key to understanding this result, is to note that the atmospheric concentration
of CO2 is a global public good. Carbon dioxide mixes thoroughly in the atmosphere:
the concentration is therefore fairly uniform over the globe. It is, however, a privately
produced public good: it is produced by every individual who runs a car or a heating
furnace, and by every firm operating transportation or burning fuel in any other way.
Carbon dioxide emission, the production of a public good, is in fact a by-product of
the consumption and production of private goods.
These points were made in Chichilnisky [2] and Chichilnisky and Heal [4], where
this simple observation was shown to have other far-reaching consequences. In partic-
ular, these papers establish that the equalization of marginal abatement costs across
countries is not sufficient for Pareto efficiency, and is also not necessary in the sense
that Pareto efficient allocations may have different marginal costs. In this paper we
show that this line of argument, when developed further, has the implication already
mentioned, namely that efficiency and distribution cannot be separated.
We also investigate the extent to which a Lindahl equilibrium, rather than a
Walrasian equilibrium, is the appropriate concept when seeking efficiency in permit
markets. There is a simple reason why this might be so: a Lindahl equilibrium
is the only market equilibrium that we know which leads to efficiency with public
goods (see Foley [11]). And a permit market is in fact a market which determines
the production of public goods. We might therefore expect that efficiency would
require the key feature of a Lindahl equilibrium, which is a multiplicity of prices. In
a Lindahl equilibrium, each producer of a public good is paid for her production by
each consumer, and the per unit payment typically varies from consumer to consumer.
In section 5 we establish conditions that are sufficient for uniform prices to achieve
efficiency in a permit market.
2. EFFICIENCY AND INTERNATIONAL EMISSIONS
Following the models in Chichilnisky [2] and Chichilnisky and Heal [4], we consider
a world economy with I countries, / > 2, indexed by i = 1,.., 7. Each country has a
utility function U{ which depends on its consumption of a vector of private goods ct- =
(ci,i) Q,2, •••? Ct.m) where m is the number of private goods, and also on the quality of the
world's atmosphere, a, which is a public good. Formally, u,-(ct-,a) measures welfare,
where Ui : 3£m+1 —> 3£ is a continuous, strictly concave and increasing function. It is
assumed to be twice continuously difFerentiable. The quality of the atmosphere, a, is
measured by for example the reciprocal or the negative of its concentration of CO2.
The concentration of CO2 is "produced" by emissions of carbon, which are positively
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associated with the levels of production of private goods. Let yi be a vector giving
the production levels of the m private goods in country i.
a = ^2 a*"> ai = ®i(yi)i f° r each country i = 1,.., 7, and ——- < 0 Vz. (1)
a is a measure of atmospheric quality overall, and at- is an index of the abatement
carried out by country i. The "production functions" or "abatement functions" $;
are continuous, continuously difFerentiable and strictly concave, and show the level of
abatement or quality of the atmosphere decreasing with the output of consumption1.
An allocation of consumption and abatement across all countries is a vector
Feasibility in this case is defined by constraint (1) and by the condition that the total
consumption of each private good worldwide be equal to the total production, i.e.,
E « = . £ Vi (2)
Constraint (2) allows private goods to be transferred freely between countries, i.e.,
it allows unrestricted lump sum international redistributions. This is a rather strong
and unrealistic assumption, which gives a full first-best solution. It is not of course
equivalent to modeling free trade between countries as no balance of payments con-




where p £ 3£m is a world price vector. This condition requires the value of the differ-
ence between consumption and production to be zero at world prices, which implies
that the value of goods which are imported, and for which consumption exceeds
production, equals the value of goods which are exported and for which production
therefore exceeds consumption.
An allocation is called feasible if it satisfies the constraints (1) and (4). A feasible
allocation (CJ,«J, ..., c ,^ a/*) is Pareto efficient if there is no other feasible solution at
which every country's utility is at least as high, and one's utility is strictly higher, than
at (cj,af, ...,Cjf, a/*). A Pareto efficient allocation can be characterized as a solution
to the problem of maximizing the utility of a designated country, subject to the other
1
 We can suppose that the functions $,• embody information about countries' initial endowments of
goods. By assuming strict concavity, we are ignoring the problem of the fundamental non-convexity
associated with externalities (Starrett [18]).
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countries all reaching prescribed utility levels. The solutions of this problem as the
prescribed utility levels vary over all feasible values describe the utility possibility
frontier. The characterization of Pareto efficiency is formalized and solved in the
Appendix: a solution has to satisfy the following conditions:
——- = \k—— V/ = 1,.., m and V& ^ i. (4)
where country i is the designated country whose utility is being maximized, and A& is
a Lagrange multiplier associated with the constraint that country k reach a specified
welfare level, and
= ^ 1C%L, v / > a n d for k ^ h 7T-- = ^ / ? ; ' vz (5)
Note that the marginal cost of abatement in country i in terms of good / is just
the reciprocal of the marginal productivity with respect to / of the function $,-:
A (6)
Chichilnisky and Heal [4] established the following proposition in the case of one
private good. The extension to the present case is immediate.
Proposition 1. At a Pareto efficient allocation {c\,a\,...,c*I,ai*), in each country
the marginal cost of abatement MC{{a*) in terms of private good I is inversely pro-
portional to the marginal valuation of the private good /, Xidui/dcij. In particular,
the marginal costs will be equal across countries if and only if the marginal valuations
of the private goods are equal, i.e., for each good I, Xidui/dcn is independent of i.
It follows that with constraint (2), marginal costs will always be equalized, as
private goods can always be shifted between countries via lump sum redistributions
to equate their marginal valuations. However, if each country is required to consume
what it produces, or to trade internationally subject to a balance of trade constraint,
this will not be true (see Chichilnisky and Heal [5]).
3. INTERNATIONAL EMISSION MARKETS
So far we have characterized first best Pareto efficient allocations, i.e., allocation which
are Pareto efficient in a framework in which lump sum redistribution are possible.
Next we introduce an international market for tradeable permits, and investigate the
efficiency of the equilibria in this market. Now we model a policy-relevant situation
and assume that the initial distribution of emission permits is the only policy variable
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that can address distributional issues, and in particular that unrestricted lump sum
redistributions of private goods are not possible. We assume that each country is
given an initial endowment of permits to emit Ei units of CO2, where YliEi = E*,
the desired level of total emissions. They can trade these as price takers in a market
in which there is a single price pe for a permit to emit one unit. We shall remark below
that the assumption of a single price for the emission permits could be a restrictive
one: given the that the resource allocation problem involves public goods, there is a
presumption in favor of a more complex pricing system.
If the number of units of CO2 emitted exceeds the number of permits a country
has, it has to buy the difference in the permit market: otherwise, it can sell excess
permits and use the proceeds to buy private goods at prices pi. A country therefore
maximizes its utility U{ (at-,a) subject to the following budget constraint:
J2 ciw = J2 y^pi+Vt {Ei + di} (7)
2 1
In (7) the level of abatement at- enters with a positive sign as pe multiplies the dif-
ference between the endowment of permits to emit and the actual level of emissions,
e,-. Clearly emissions and abatement are negatively related and we shall take it for
simplicity that et- = — a;. This budget constraint requires that for each country the
value of consumption equal the value of production plus the net revenue from the sale
of permits. Note that (7) can be rewritten as
Pi=Pe {Ei + a,-} (8)
Here the left hand side is the difference between the value of domestic consumption
and production, i.e., the balance of trade. A surplus of consumption over production
(i.e., a position of net imports) is funded by the revenue generated by sales of permits
in international markets. Conversely, a net purchase of permits in international mar-
kets has to be matched by a surplus of production over consumption and hence a net
export position. This interpretation of the budget constraint, and a comparison of the
balance of trade condition (8) with the actual budget constraint (3), makes it clear
that controlling the initial endowments of emission rights, net of actual emissions,
act as a substitute for lump sum transfers by allowing countries to avoid the need to
balance budgets internationally. This point will be important later in the argument.
Each country seeks to maximize its utility Ui (ct-, a) subject to the budget constraint
(7) and to the production relations given in (1). We shall assume that in so doing
it supposes the total level of emissions to be fixed at E*, the desired total level.
This in effect implies the existence of a credible inter governmental agency which
sets and implements global emission targets: an alternative, which we do not explore
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here, would be to look for a Nash equilibrium in countries' abatement levels. In this
case, each country would observe the emissions of each other and then choose its
optimal emission level on the assumption that these levels are fixed. (For a similar
development, see Dasgupta and Heal [10], chapter 3).
In the case of a fixed total level of emissions E*, each country chooses consumption







These are standard conditions: (9) just requires that marginal rates of substitution
between goods be equated to their price rations, and (10) requires tangency between
the production possibility frontier and an iso-profit hyperplane. The latter implies in
particular that for given prices, levels of production (and therefore also of emission)
are determined independently of the utility function. (Of course, in equilibrium the
prices will depend on preferences.)
How do the first order conditions (9) and (10) chosen by the country compare
with the conditions (4) and (5) which describe Pareto efficient allocations? Clearly
(10) is the same as (5) provided that
E = —~^du = kdCk£u \/k^i (ii)
This condition can only hold if J^- and AfcJ^ *- are independent of i and k. (Note
that without the assumption of a single price pe for permits, there would be no such
restriction.) Condition (4) required for Pareto efficiency automatically implies this.
However, condition (9) from the countries' optimization problems does not. So utility
maximization subject to the budget constraint (7) does not lead to the conditions
needed for efficiency. There is an additional requirement represented by (4), namely
that J^- = ^k-gf*- V/, Vfc 7^  i. This condition would of course be satisfied if there
were policy instruments available to redistribute resources without restriction across
countries—if for example lump sum redistributions were possible. In the absence of
such instruments, what is required to ensure that (4) is met and efficiency attained
in the permit market?
4. EQUITY AND EFFICIENCY IN PERMIT MARKETS
Condition (4) requires that for each good, its marginal social valuation be equal for
every country. This is clearly a condition on the distribution of income or wealth.
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Let us look in more detail at the determinants of the terms J^-. As Ui = Ui (c{,E*),
where E* is fixed, the derivatives of w,- with respect to consumption can depend
only on consumption levels. These in turn depend via the budget constraint (7)
on prices pi, production levels yij, abatement levels ai and initial endowments of
emission rights E{. Once prices are given, production and abatement levels are fully
determined via (10). In the absence of policy instruments which can effect unrestricted
redistributions across countries, the only variables then available for ensuring that
marginal social valuations of consumption are equalized across countries are therefore
the initial allocations of permits, and only those initial permit allocations which ensure
that (4) is satisfied will lead to Pareto efficient allocations. We formalize this below,
and show that very few initial allocations satisfy this condition.
4.1. An example—one private good and two countries. Before giving a
general treatment of these results, we give a diagrammatic analysis of the case of
a single private good with two identical countries. Figure 1 shows the abatement-
production frontier and the preferences over combinations of public and private goods
for each country. We suppose a total emission level E* to have been chosen: this is
of course assumed to be a level associated with a Pareto efficient allocation on the
utility possibility frontier. Then the total abatement level of the two countries must
sum to — E*: as they are identical, each must produce a level of abatement of —E*/2.
Each country's production of the private good is now determined to be the level that
corresponds to an abatement level of —E*/2, and the relative price of the public and
private good is therefore determined to be the slope of the frontier at this point.
Each country's consumption of abatement is A* = — E*: its consumption of the
private good is determined by maximizing utility subject to the equation
Ci = yi + pe{Ei + ai}
where ct- and yi are country i's consumption and production of the single private
good, and pe is the relative price of the emission permits. Here yi, pe and a,- are
all fully determined from the total level of emissions E*. Hence only Ei, the initial
endowment of permits, is available to control ct. This variable has therefore to be
used to ensure that marginal valuations of the private good satisfy the condition (4)
needed for Pareto efficiency.
Figure 1 illustrates how this can be done. If both countries are given endowments
of permits equal to their levels of emission, neither will buy or sell private goods for
permits, and each will consume the same amount of the private good, namely the
amount that they produce. They will consume levels of the private good given by the
horizontal coordinate of the production point in figure 1. Their
A*
A*/2
Abatement Consumption vector for country at b'.
b'i
Consumption vector for country at b.
Production point
Export of permits
by country at b.
Import of private good by country at b.
b
Q*, Production of Private good
private good
Figure 1: two identical countries producing one private good and emissions. Each
produces abatement of A*/2, where A* is the total level of emissions. This determines
the output of private goods Q* and the price ratio, as shown. If each country is given A*/2
permits, each will consume Q* of the private good and have the same marginal utility
for this good. A country with permits in excess of A*/2 will sell permits and buy the private
good arriving at point a on the line tangent to the production point: the other country will be at the symmetric point a1.
b and b1 form a similar symmetric pair. At the pairs (a.a1) and (b.b1) the marginal utilities
of consumption differ. The country at b consumes at point b*, where the level of abatement is
A* and the consumption level is production plus imports of private goods. Similarly the country
at b' consumes at b".
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consumption of the public good abatement will be the sum of the production levels of
both countries, which is A*. Hence each country's consumption vector has a vertical
coordinate equal to A* and a horizontal coordinate equal to its consumption of the
private good, which in general is production (the same for both countries) plus imports
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from the sale of permits or minus exports to pay for the purchase of permits.
Consider the case in which both countries have an initial allocation of permits
equal to their production of CO2. As they both neither import nor export the private
good and so consume and produce the same amounts, and also consume the same
amount of the public good (by definition), their marginal valuations of the private
goods must be the same. Suppose now that condition (4) requires for efficiency that
J^i.
 = \2-^r2- where 1 and 2 are the two countries, / denotes the single private good,
and A2 < 1. Then to satisfy (4) country two's consumption of the private good has
to be decreased and country one's increased from their common production level.
This can be achieved by giving country one an endowment of permits in excess of its
emission, and country two an endowment less than its emission. Country one then
increase its consumption of the private good by selling its spare permits and using
the proceeds to buy the private good, whereas two is forced to sell the private good
to buy permits. One's marginal utility of the private good will be less than two's, and
the ratio will decrease continuously from unity as one's initial endowment of permits
is raised above the emission level corresponding to its production of the private good
(and two's is correspondingly reduced, as the total must be constant at E*).
Consider the straight line through the countries' production points tangent to the
production frontier, as shown in figure 1. Each country produces a mix of abatement
and private good given by the point of tangency and then trades private goods for
emission permits along the line tangent to the production frontier. If it has more
permits than needed (i.e., more than E*/2) it will add consumption of the private
good by selling permits and buying the private good along the tangency line, whose
slope is the relative price of permits and the private good. As its move along this
line, its consumption of abatement remains constant: it is selling surplus permits,
not abatement. However, its consumption of the private good changes. The other
country will be symmetrically placed on this line relative to the production point. In
this way we can reach an allocation at which all markets will clear, total emissions
will be E*, and condition (4) needed for efficiency will be satisfied. We can do this by
picking the permit allocations and therefore consumption levels of the private good
correctly. As the ratio of the countries' marginal utilities changes continuously with
their initial allocations of permits, there will generally be at most a finite number
of initial allocations at which the efficiency conditions hold. In fact, in this simple
example, one would expect that there would be just one initial distribution of permits
which will lead to efficiency. This argument establishes the following result:
Proposition 2. Let E* be the level of total emissions at a Pareto efficient allocation
of resources in the economy described in section 2 with a single private good and two
identical countries. Then only a finite number of ways of allocating the total emission
E* among the countries as initial endowments will lead to market equilibria which
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are Pareto efficient.
The diagrammatic analysis illustrating proposition 1 can in fact be pushed further,
as in figure 2. As figure 1 shows, each possible distribution of the total emission
permits E * between the two countries leads them to a pair of levels of consumption
of the private good given by the horizontal coordinates of pairs of points such as
(a,a') or (b,b') which are symmetrically placed on the line which is tangent to the
production frontier at the production point. These pairs of points in turn give rise to
consumption vectors for the public and private and private goods together represented
by points such as b" and b* in figure 1. From figure 1 we can ascertain the utility
levels of these points. Suppose we plot the utility levels arising from all such possible
distributions of the total E* permits: what does this set of points look like?
We know that few points will be Pareto efficient, so that this must form a curve
largely inside the utility possibility frontier, touching this frontier at at most a finite
number of points (see the following proposition for a complete formal proof). In fact
in the present two-country fully symmetric case it is easy to see that once we have
an allocation of permits that satisfies (4), departures from this allocation increase
the difference from equality of the two sides in (4), so that the efficient allocation is
unique. Figure 2 therefore illustrates the set of utility vectors associated with different
allocations of the total of E* permits, and also shows the overall utility possibility
frontier. Each point on the frontier corresponds to a different total emission level and
hence to a different total number of permits, and for each point on the frontier there
is one way of allocating the corresponding total of permits which is efficient and gives
the utility vector on the utility possibility frontier. Lin [14] solves analytically for the
curves in figure 2 for specific utility and production functions.
Utility of country one
Overall utility possibility frontier, given unrestricted lump-sum redistributions.
Utility vectors at the equilibria attainable
by redistributing a total number of emission
permits equal to total emissions at point A.
Only one way of distributing this total leads
to a Pare to efficient allocation at equilibrium.
There is a similar curve corresponding to
each point on the utility possibility fromtier.
Utility of country two
Figure 2: utility levels associated with different allocations of a fixed total of permits
International Emission Permits: Equity and Efficiency 12
4.2. The general case. The above result in fact holds for the general case, but
the argument is less intuitive. Formally, we establish the following proposition:
Proposition 3. Let E* be the level of total emissions at a Pareto efficient allocation
of resources in the economy described in section 2. Assume countries maximize utility
subject to the budget constraint (7) given by the ability to trade emission permits.
Assume furthermore that a regularity condition defined in the Appendix is satisfied.
Then only a finite number of ways of allocating the total emission E* among countries
as initial endowments will lead to market equilibria which are Pareto efficient.
The proof of this proposition is given in the Appendix. It is worth noting that
the assumption of strict concavity, and the regularity assumption, are needed for
this result. Otherwise, one can construct counterexamples. For example, with quasi-
linear preferences of the form U{ (a) + c<iCi,m eti > 0, there may be infinitely many
allocations of permits that will lead to efficient outcomes.
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Intuitively, why will only some initial allocations lead to efficiency? In the context
of public goods, an equilibrium must satisfy a more demanding set of conditions than
a competitive equilibrium with only private goods. In addition to the first order
condition for utility maximization, and to the equality of supply and demand for each
good (both of which are common to the two problems), there is another requirement.
This is that every agent (country in the present case) should have the same demand for
the public good. The need for this of course follows immediately from the definition
of a public good. For a given number of goods and agents, there are more equations
to be satisfied at an equilibrium and consequently one would expect equilibria to be
more difficult to obtain.
It is worth noting that although the dependence of efficiency on distribution runs
quite counter to the thrust of the first and second welfare theorems, there are parallels
in the literature. For example, in economies with increasing returns to scale, there
are some allocations of a given total of initial endowments which are compatible with
attainment of efficiency at a marginal cost pricing equilibrium and some that are
not—see Brown and Heal [1]. The orthogonality of efficiency and distribution may
therefore be limited to "classical" economic environments free from increasing returns
and public goods or externalities.
5. COUNTRY-SPECIFIC PERMIT PRICES
We have remarked several times that the use of a uniform permit price, to be paid
by every country, is restrictive. In this section we investigate the gains from having
a permit price specific to each country. The intuition suggesting that there may be
gains in this case comes from two sources.
One is the structure of Lindahl equilibria (for a definition of Lindahl equilibria, see
Foley [11] or Dasgupta and Heal [10]): as already remarked, at a Lindahl equilibrium
each producer of a public good is paid by every consumer for each unit produced, and
in principle all consumers may pay different prices. In the present context, the analog
would be the following. Any country thinking of producing one more unit of emissions
would have to purchase from every other country the right to emit that extra unit.
Only when it has been sold that right by each affected country is it entitled to emit.
It would therefore have to buy an emission permit from each affected country, with
possibly a different price ruling in each bilateral trade. This would give as many
prices as there are in a Lindahl equilibrium.
An alternative way of reaching the same intuition is to think of markets for ex-
ternalities, as described by Meade [15] in his famous bees and apples example (see
[10] for an exposition relevant to the present model). In this context, each pairwise
externality is a separate commodity, separately priced. There are therefore as many
prices as there are pairs of interacting producers and consumers of externalities.
If each country faces a different price for emission permits, the budget constraint
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(7) becomes instead
where pit€ is the price of an emission permit to country i. Instead of (10), each
country's first order condition in production now becomes
TF" = - — (13)
fill- i 71-
and in place of (11) the condition for permit markets to attain efficiency is
\ duk
Pi 9Cfc,Z W 7
Pk,e ^
This condition is satisfied if A^J^*- is the same for all k. In fact this is always
implied by the necessary condition (4) for Pareto efficiency, at least for the version of
the resource allocation problem set out in section 2 above. If however this resource
allocation problem were altered so that lump sum redistributions of private goods
between countries were no longer possible, i.e., if (2) were modified to require domestic
consumption to equal production, or alternatively to require the value of any difference
to be zero (trade balance), then the equalization of marginal social valuations of
the private goods would no longer be a condition needed for efficiency. We show
in the Appendix that if international lump sum redistributions are ruled out and
domestic consumption is required to equal domestic production, then condition (4)
is no longer necessary for Pareto efficiency and only condition (5) is required. This
point is discussed further in Chichilnisky and Heal [4] and [5]. In these case there
is a real efficiency gain to having permit prices that are country-specific, for without
them it would not be possible to attain a Pareto efficient allocation.
6. APPENDIX
Characterization of Pareto efficiency.
A Pareto efficient allocation solves the following problem:
j (ci,a) subject to Uk (ck,a) = Nk
and £t- ai = a
The second line of this problem allows unrestricted international lump sum redistri-
bution: world-wide consumption has to equal world-wide production. To solve this
problem write out the Lagrangian
£ =
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where a has been replaced by £,• $j (yt-). Differentiating with respect to the com-
ponents of C{ and t/,- gives the first order conditions for efficiency used in the text.
Without the possibility of international lump sum redistributions, the problem and
the necessary condition are different. For example, suppose that in each country
consumption is required to equal production. Then the second line of the problem
above is dropped, and the vector ?/t in the third line replaced by c,-. In this case the
necessary conditions for Pareto efficiency are just (5): conditions (4) are no longer
required.
Proof of Proposition 3.
The conditions (4) required for Pareto efficiency, J^ *- = A^J^*- V/, V& ^ i, consti-
tute a system of (7 — l)m equations. Rewrite them as
dui duk
A = 0
 I 1 5 )
Efficiency now requires that we locate a zero of a system of (7 — l)m non-linear
equations given by (15). Note that the independent arguments of the functions in
(15) are E{, i = 1,.., 7 and pi, / = 1,.., m and e. For once the prices of all goods are
chosen, the production levels of private goods and of abatement are determined by
equation (10) giving first order conditions in production. And these levels, together
with prices and endowments of permits, determine consumption levels through the
budget constraint (7) and the first order conditions on consumption (9). Now, as
both the E{ and the prices are non-negative and sum to a fixed number, the left
hand side of system (15) is a function, call it £l, denned on ^I~1^m. This function
also takes values in s^7"1)™: Q
 : gft('-i)™ _> ftC7"1)™, Q(x) = ^ ^ - Xk^1 where
v / dciti K ackti
x G 3l(I~1)m. Proposition 3 uses the following regularity condition, which essentially
states that the first order conditions for efficiency in equation (4) change smoothly
as prices and permit allocations change:
Regularity condition: the matrix of first partial derivatives of the function 17 has full
rank.
Note that VI is defined on a compact set in $£(I~1)m. It therefore follows that if
the rank of the matrix of first partial derivatives of 0 is maximal, there will be at
most a finite number of points (Ei,.., Ei,pi, ..,pm,pe) 6 ^ / ~ 1 ) m at which 0 = 0 and
the conditions needed for efficiency are satisfied. This is implied by the regularity
condition, so that the proposition is proven. •
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